Abstract
Introduction
Operator error has been blamed for many accidents and incidents in safety-critical systems. It is important that human-machine interface (HMI) designers should understand the relationship between operator actions and the hazards associated with a system. In this paper, we consider the concept of the impact of an action or human-error, and show how this concept may be useful to HMI designers. We begin from an informal definition of impact as: the effect that an action or sequence of actions has on the safe and successful operation of a system.
We show how a quantitative measure of impact could be generated prior to, or in parallel with HMI design. We argue that an analysis of impact: would complement existing * To appear in proceedings of COMPASS '96 design and analysis techniques by providing valuable additional information for the early stages of HMI design; and that quantification of impact may be more soundly based than attempts to quantify human-error probabilities. We also make some observations on the relevance of impact analysis to the design of autonomous and semi-autonomous computer based control systems.
Structure of the rest of this paper
In section 2, we discuss current approaches to the problem of design to take account of human-error in safetycritical systems, and we argue that such approaches are limited in the support that they can give to the early stages of HMI design. In section 3, we introduce the concept of impact, consider its quantification, and its relationship with other reliability measures. In section 4, we illustrate the calculation of impact, and how it might affect design decisions, by reference to a simple example system. In section 5, we discuss our conclusions and further work.
Designing to take account of Human Error
A number of techniques are already available to support the design and analysis of HMIs for safety-critical systems. Current techniques can be divided into three major classes. The three classes complement each other and address different phases of HMI development. The first class is rooted in probabilistic risk assessment and is concerned with quantifying, in probabilistic terms, the reliability of the human operator in performing specified tasks. The second class is rooted in cognitive psychology and is concerned with qualitative explanations of human-error and providing heuristic guidelines to aid design. The third class involves multidisciplinary teams analysing plant designs and reasoning about the possible effects of human-actions on the system. We shall consider the strengths and weaknesses of these three classes of technique in turn.
Quantifying Human Reliability
During the 1970's and early 1980's there was an increasing awareness of the importance of human-error as a factor in incidents and accidents involving complex technologies. As a result of this concern, risk analysts sought to develop methods to quantify the reliability of a human operator as a system component, thus allowing human-error to be accounted for in an overall assessment of the risk associated with a system. Examples of such techniques are: Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [18] , Technica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO) [2] , Human Cognitive Reliability [7] , Operator Action Trees (OATS) [6] and the Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM) [4] . Reason [16] (ch8) provides an overview, and critique of these techniques. A common factor of all these techniques is their emphasis on the probability of correct or erroneous human performance, rather than an exploration of the severity of consequences that might be associated with a specific error.
The major advantage of these techniques is that they are quantitative, thus allowing the most significant weaknesses to be identified. Also, the outputs of many of these techniques can be integrated naturally into the overall risk assessment for the system. This permits risk analysts to consider alternatives of improving the reliability of human elements of the system or improving the reliability of machine elements.
Unfortunately, all these approaches suffer from their inability to adequately take into account aspects of the HMI that might affect the probability of human-error. This inability stems from a number of sources.
1. For most techniques 'performance shaping factors' are used to represent individual differences between operators and aspects of the environment. The presence and strengths of these performance shaping factors can only be estimated on the basis of expert judgement. These factors may substantially alter the hypothesised probabilities of particular human-errors occurring. Indeed, Moray [14] states that:
performance shaping factors have a completely devastating impact on numerical estimates of the probability of human error"(p342)
2. Where quantitative information is provided within a technique in relation to the probability of an operator making a particular type of error, the data used may be biased. The use of data collected from simulator experiments to calibrate measurements, as in OATS and SLIM, has been questioned since operators in a simulation may be more willing to select costly, but safe courses of action, e.g. shutting down a plant, than they would be in real life.
3. The focus on the probability of error during procedure execution, makes these techniques more suitable to the analysis of the reliability of humans in executing recovery procedures after some initiating event has occurred, than in analysis of human-errors in normal operating procedures where latent errors may be introduced into the system.
Finally, most of these approaches cannot be applied until the HMI design is developed to quite a high level of detail, e.g. the input and output devices have been selected, and their size and relative locations have been determined. Thus, these approaches can only support the revision of an existing design, but are not suitable to guide the initial design process.
Using cognitive accounts of human-error in design
An alternative approach to the problem of human-error has been developed by cognitive psychologists. This approach begins by attempting to understand the cognitive behaviour of the operators of complex systems. On the basis of cognitive models, qualitative explanations of the mechanisms that give rise to human-error can be generated, and suggestions for design techniques that might avoid or compensate for these mechanisms are identified. For examples of the models used, see [15, 13, 16, 9] . For examples of design techniques, see [20, 22, 19] .
These approaches have the advantage that they can be used to guide the initial design of the HMI. However, from the point of view of risk analysis, they are limited by the lack of quantitative information provided. In particular:
1. they do not take into account the relative severity of hazards that might be associated with the operation of the system; 2. nor do they consider the relative reliability of the machine components (as opposed to human components) that contribute to the safety of the human-machine system.
Thus, whilst they are able to identify possible weaknesses in a design and may be used to suggest general improvements to the design, they are not able to support trade-off decisions between design alternatives.
Qualitative Human Error Identification
Kirwan [12] provides a review of methods that can be used to identify possible human-errors that could occur in the operation of a system, and to document how such errors might be avoided. Many of the techniques that Kirwan describes can be related to standard risk analysis techniques such as failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and hazard and operability studies (HazOps). These techniques decompose the activities and tasks of the operator and then attempt to identify, for each step of each task, all the possible externally observable human-errors that could occur. The possible consequences of these errors are then considered, and possible design changes to avoid or recover from them are noted. Some of the techniques in [12] additionally try to identify the psychological mechanisms that might give rise to the error. Similar techniques aimed at identifying opportunities for human-error are also reported in [17, 3, 1] .
This type of method can make a valuable contribution to reducing the cost of human-error and in some cases reducing risk. However, they are typically very resource intensive. This is because they require multi-disciplined teams including: engineers familiar with the design of the physical plant and the consequences of events within it; human-factors specialists to identify possible human-errors; and risk analysts to guide the procedure and ensure adequate coverage and documentation. Also, many of the techniques are only applicable after the HMI design has been refined to a fairly detailed level. Thus, as with the quantitative techniques of human reliability analysis, they are unable to guide the early stages of HMI design.
Summary
Existing techniques to support HMI design for safetycritical systems are limited because they do not provide information about the impact of possible human-errors in a form that can be used during the early stages of HMI design. Quantitative human reliability assessment and qualitative techniques for human-error identification tend to be applicable only after the design has been developed to some level of detail. Cognitive design approaches fail to consider the relative reliability of physical systems or to provide quantification. Where quantification is provided it focuses on the probability of particular human actions occurring, which itself will depend on HMI design qualities, rather than on the severity of consequences that might arise from those actions, which may be less dependent on design qualities.
In the rest of this paper, we show how the concept of impact can be developed to provide a quantitative measure. We show how an impact measure can be calculated on the basis of early risk analysis activities, and can be used as an input to the process of HMI design. Impact provides a means of discussing the consequences of possible human-errors, independent of the probability of these errors occurring within a particular design. Concentrating on the severity of consequences, rather than the probability, means that impact assessment can be based on statistical data on the failure of machine components, rather than questionable estimates of human-error probabilities.
Quantifying impact
The additional technique we propose in this paper is based on the observation that risk (as used in probabilistic risk assessment) is a function of two variables: probability and severity. Rather than attempting to quantify the probability of a human-error occurring, our approach seeks to quantify the severity that should be associated with erroneous actions or erroneous executions of procedures performed by an operator. We argue that such a measure could be used to help identify to HMI designers the most important areas of interaction design, and so enable them to focus techniques such as those suggested in [20, 22, 19] , on those areas of the design where human-error may be most significant.
Given the philosophy that no single point of failure in a system should cause a hazard, a single operator error should only ever result in an increase in the probability of a hazard. Consequently, the measure of impact that we propose is a measure of the change in risk associated with the system.
The question then arises as to how such a measure could be computed before a design for the HMI has been developed. To arrive at a suitable computation we make two assumptions.
Firstly, we make a simplifying assumption that the HMI design will always lag behind the design of the machine elements of the system. For example, in developing the design of a chemical plant, the conceptual layout of pipes, valves, tanks, boilers, heat exchangers, process vessels etc. will be developed, before the HMI that permits control of these components is designed. Given this relationship, it is possible to conduct a preliminary risk analysis of the machine components of the system prior to the design of the HMI. Such an analysis can then be used to inform our proposed analysis of impact. Figure 1 presents a possible ordering of activities in the early stages of a design process. The activities are grouped into three categories, risk analysis activities, activities associated with the design of the machine elements of the system, and activities related to the design of the HMI. Figure 1 shows that impact analysis is dependent on the availability of an initial risk study of the machine elements of the human-machine system, and a specification of the tasks and actions that the operator may be able to perform. The identification of basic actions that the operator is able to perform is particularly important if automated support for control actions is to be provided. In these cases the operator may be able to make major changes to the plant state by means of a very small number of actions. The impact of such actions needs to be carefully considered. The specific outputs from an initial risk analysis that we aim to use are fault trees relating component failures to known hazards. Note that these fault trees do not need to include information about human error. At this stage the analysis should only deal with the machine components, and so should be based on (relatively) hard failure data. This contrasts with the imprecision that arises in attempts to quantify humanerror probabilities.
This first assumption may not hold in some cases because of the desire to maintain consistency with previous generations of a design, which will influence operators' behaviour. However, we would argue that an analysis of impact could still be valuable to guide design modifications, particularly when new functionality is introduced.
Our second assumption is that any state of a component that can be reached by normal control actions on the part of the operator, is also identified as a possible failure mode of the component.
If this second assumption is met, then we may associate the state changes that the operator can effect by acting on the system with basic events of the fault trees. For instance, if the operator is able to open and close valves, and a basic event in some fault tree is the failure of some valve in the open state, then opening the valve should be associated with this basic event.
To quantify the impact of the operator's action, we consider how the probability of the root hazard of the fault tree is affected when the probability of the basic event changes from its normal value (i.e. the probability of spontaneous failure in a given time interval) to one. Impact is then a function of this probability change and the severity of the hazard.
Notice that the impact of an action is the same whether it is performed by a human operator or some other agent. This suggests that it may be useful for the designers of autonomous or semi-autonomous computer based control systems to consider the impact of the actions that the control system can initiate.
In terms of risk analysis, the probabilistic element of our proposed impact measure is closely related to the Birnbaum basic event importance [8] . This value is defined by:
where g(1 i , Q(t)) is the probability of the top event of a fault tree given that event i is known to have occurred 1 , and g(0 i , Q(t)) is the probability of the top event given that event i is known not to have occurred. Our proposed impact measure is:
Within the field of risk analysis, Birnbaum's measure has been criticised as a measure of component importance. This is because risk analysts require measures to identify the 'weakest link' in a design, in the sense of the component which will deliver the greatest improvement in overall reliability for a given increase component reliability. Birnbaum's measure does not identify the 'weakest link' in this sense. For instance, for a system using two similar components in parallel, one of which is more reliable than the other, Birnbaum's measure gives a greater importance to the more reliable component, whilst the overall reliability of the system is best improved by improving the reliability of the less reliable component. However, our proposed measure is appropriate for a measure of the impact of an action, since if the operator switches off the more reliable component, then that will have a greater effect on the overall reliability of the system than if the operator switches off the less reliable component.
In the rest of this paper, we illustrate the computation of impact in a case study and discuss how a impact might be used to inform HMI design. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of a power plant design. In the plant two pumps are arranged in parallel. These pumps circulate heating fluid through (one or two) gas fired boilers and then through (one or two) heat exchangers which transfer the heat to (one or two) secondary circuits in which steam driven turbines generate electricity.
An Example of Impact Analysis
The plant has three major operating modes, namely:
• low power A -using boiler 1, pump 1, exchanger 1, and requiring valves v1, v4, v6 and v7 to be open with all other valves closed as in figure 2;
• low power B -using boiler 2, pump 2, exchanger 2 and requiring valves v2, v5, v6, v9 to be open with all others closed; and
• high power -using both pumps, both boilers, both exchangers and requiring valves v1, v2, v4, v5, v6, v7, v9 open and all others closed.
The major hazards associated with the plant are either overheating of the boilers and / or failure to generate electricity. To guard against overheating of the boilers, sensors monitor the flow of heating fluid into the boilers at points (s1, s2), and regulators (r1, r2) can be used to cut off the flow of gas into the boilers through the gas valves (gv1, gv2). Figure 3 shows a fault tree constructed for the hazard of overheating the boiler B1 whilst the system is in the low power A mode. The fault tree does not include failures that might arise as a result of human-error placing the plant in a non-standard state, merely the conditions that might give rise to boiler 1 overheating with the system in one operating mode that makes use of boiler 1. Also the tree does not analyse the different ways that the gas regulatory system for the boiler might fail, e.g. failure of the sensor, controller or gas inlet valve, but treats the regulatory system as a single component.
Impact of a single action
Analysis of the fault tree shows that the minimal cut sets 2 for the boiler overheating are:
2 Cut set analysis is a standard procedure for fault trees. A cut set of a fault tree is a set of events that is sufficient to cause the root event of the fault tree. A minimal cut set is a cut set for which any proper subset does not necessarily lead to the occurrence of the root event. Many computer packages for fault tree analysis provide for the automated identification of minimal cut sets. For the purposes of this example we assign (arbitrary) component failure probabilities as follows:
• Probability of failure for regulator as 0.01 failures per unit time;
• for any valve to fail open 0.01 per unit time;
• for any valve to fail closed 0.001 per unit time;
• for pump to fail off 0.02 per unit time;
• for the exchanger to be blocked 0.0001 per unit time.
In a real analysis these probabilities would be based on reliability statistics for similar components, collected over extended periods. This contrasts sharply with the poor quality of data available to estimate human-error probabilities. Using these figures we can now consider questions such as 'what is the impact of opening valve v5?'. This action affects only two of the above minimal cut sets, namely sets (g) and (h). The probabilities of these cut sets being satisfied in any unit time, without opening the valve, are both 0.000001, giving a total contribution to the overall probability of the boiler overheating of 0.000002. However, if v5 is known to be open, then the probabilities associated with these cut sets are both 0.0001 giving a total contribution of 0.0002. The probabilities associated with all the other cut sets will remain the same. Thus, the action will increase the probability of the hazard occurring by 0.000198.
Similar computations give changes in hazard probability of: a) switching off the pump P1: 0.0098; b) closing any of the valves v4, v6, v7 or v1: 0.00999; c) opening valve v2 or v3: 0.000198.
From the above calculations we may determine the relative impact of these operations with respect to the hazard of the boiler overheating. 
Design responses to impact assessment
HMI designers may respond to impact assessments in a number of ways. Here we suggest a few possible heuristics.
H1 Consider the use of guarding dialogues for high impact actions
In our power plant example, suppose that the HMI is to be implemented using a single VDU and a mouse. The VDU normally displays an overview of the plant state, and the operator controls individual components by selecting the component with the mouse. When a component is selected, a dialogue window is generated which allows the operator to control the component. Given the high impact of closing any of valves 4, 6, 7, and 1 when the plant is in low power A mode, the HMI designer might introduce an additional warning message, requiring specific confirmation, to the dialogues associated with closing these valves. This option could be taken further by making the dialogue sensitive to information from the plant monitors, e.g. the confirmation dialogue could be restricted to occasions when the boiler is on (according to the information available from sensors in the plant).
H2 Make the effects of high impact actions easily perceivable
An alternative approach might concentrate on ensuring that the HMI made the effect of these high impact actions easily perceivable by the operator. This may be done by providing alarms, or by making particular pieces of information about the plant state more readily perceivable. Deciding what conditions should lead to alarms, or what elements of the plant state represent pre-cursors to hazards, requires an understanding of the structure of the hazard analysis. Although the numerical impact values do not provide this information, they may prompt the HMI designer to query the risk analyst about why a particular action has a large effect, and so improve the HMI designers knowledge of the system's functioning at critical points. This leads naturally to our third suggested heuristic:
H3 Where high impact interactions are identified, use the internal nodes of fault trees to guide design techniques An important part of design techniques such as those suggested in [20, 22, 19] , is the identification of the relationship between the functional purpose and abstract functions of a system and the physical actions that can be performed on the system. The generalised conditions describing the internal nodes of fault trees may provide useful information to HMI designers attempting to understand these relationships.
Impact and multiple hazards
Many actions will have an effect on more than one hazard. In directing design resources, display resources, and deciding where guarding dialogues are appropriate, HMI designers need to rank the various actions and errors that might occur with respect to these multiple hazards.
In our case study, a secondary hazard is failure to generate electricity. A hypothetical analysis of the impacts related to this hazard, when the plant is in low power A mode, gave probability increases for the following actions as: The ranking of these actions with respect to this hazard is different to the ranking for the overheating hazard. Any general assessment of the impact of actions needs to compare actions in terms of their effects on multiple hazards.
One possible representation associates each action with a vector of probability changes, with each component of the vector corresponding to each potential hazard. The problem of impact analysis then becomes one of comparing these multi-dimensional vectors. A partial ordering of these vectors can be achieved by defining an action A i = (A i1 , A i2 ..., A in ) to have greater negative impact than action A j = (A j1 , A j2 ..., A jn ) (where A ik is the increase in hazard probability for the k th hazard when action A i is performed) if and only each element of A i is greater than the corresponding element of A j i.e.:
This type of ordering can be described as a 'dominance' ordering.
For a complex system it may be that this partial ordering is insufficient to the needs of the HMI designer. In our power plant example, if we associate two component vectors with each action, where the first component is the increase in probability of overheating and the second is the increase in probability of generation failure then the vectors for the following actions are: opening v8 (or v9 or v10) = (0, 0.009999) -opening this valve has no effect on the overheating hazard; opening v2 (or v3) = (0.000198, 0.000396); closing gv1 = (−0.000244, 0.99) using the fact that the overall probability of overheating is 0.000244, but when the gas valve is known to be closed the hazard cannot occur (i.e. P(overheating) = 0) so the probability of the hazard occurring falls.
It is clear that the ordering suggested above does not relate any pair of these actions. Thus, we may expect that it will be necessary in most cases to investigate some parts of the ordering in more detail in order to guide the HMI designer.
One approach would be to elicit, from the risk analyst, exchange values that might indicate how much of an increase in probability in one hazard might be exchanged for a given reduction in the probability of another. Standard techniques to elicit this type of information have been developed within economic utility theory [11] . The simplest such analysis might seek to assign a numerical value for the 'severity' of each hazard, and treat the impact of each action as a weighted sum of the probabilities, i.e.
This simple analysis may represent an extreme position, since it forces the risk analyst to make judgements about relative severity of hazards that he or she may regard as incomparable. This can lead to ethical problems, since some hazards result in injury or loss of life, whilst others might result in financial losses. This would mean that the risk analyst's decisions would be open to interpretation as placing a monetary value on human life. Also, this approach may generate more information than is genuinely useful to the HMI designer who needs to select a subset of actions and tasks for particular attention, rather than deriving a complete ordering over the actions.
Other approaches may be possible that refine the ordering of actions beyond the initial partial order, but do not necessarily generate exchange values and complete utility functions. For instance, we might start with the dominance ordering introduced above, and then ask the risk analyst to make pairwise comparisons between actions and their associated vectors. Where the analyst was prepared to make a definite comparison the result of these comparisons could be represented by propositions of the form:
This would allow the analyst to record a definite preference between actions without necessarily leading to exchange values and a total ordering over the actions. By using this type of approach we might avoid exacerbating the numbers game of risk analysis, at the same time as providing information to guide the design of the HMI. A similar approach to event ranking is pursued by Johnson [10] . The problem of exploring such orderings falls into the general problem of multi-criteria decision making. For an introduction to this topic, the reader is referred to [21] .
Impact of errors in procedures
By considering single actions being performed when the plant is in a particular state, we can obtain some information on the appropriateness of interlocking mechanisms and the assignment of display resources. HMI designers also need to consider the structure of tasks and procedures for operating the plant and the possible effects of errors in the performance of these procedures. In order to analyse the impact of errors in procedures, it is useful to develop our understanding of the information encapsulated in fault trees.
Fault trees provide a means by which a risk analyst can estimate, for each major operating mode of the plant, the probabilities of each known hazard occurring. Formally we can regard the set of fault trees for a system as defining a partial function from the state space of the system to the space of n-dimensional probability vectors, where n is the number of potential hazards identified for the system. If only the root probabilities of the fault trees are considered, then domain of the function is just the set of major operating modes. If, in addition, we consider variations that include faults appearing at the leaves of the fault tree, this expands the definition of the partial function to include points in the neighbourhood of the major operating modes. Figure 4 illustrates this interpretation with respect to the probabilities of a single hazard.
Procedures, when correctly implemented, should move the system from one operating mode (the starting mode) to another (the target mode). Errors in procedures, or previously introduced latent errors, will result in the system reaching a different state in the neighbourhood of the target mode. Therefore, the impact of an error in a procedure can be measured by the difference between the hazard probability vector for the target mode, and the hazard probability vector for the mode that is actually reached. We are currently investigating the use of formal software engineering models as design representations for the HMI. If such models can be used to predict the state that will be reached as a result of a given error, then information about the impact of such errors could be made available to designers using the models. For a description of work using formal models of the HMI to predict the effects of error, see [5] .
Discussion and Further Work
In this paper we have suggested a possible approach to the HMI development that seeks to provide the HMI designer with information about the relative impact that might arise from erroneous performance of actions or procedures by an operator. This information may be particularly significant where automated support enables operators to effect major changes on the system by means of a small number of actions. However, the work presented is at an early stage of development, and a number of issues need to be addressed before such a technique could be taken out of the laboratory and used in an industrial setting. In particular:
1. The technique assumes that the set of failure states used to construct the fault trees is a superset of the states reachable by operator control actions on the system. Exclusion of a state from a fault tree is interpreted by this technique as implying that the state has no effect (or a negligible effect) on the probability of the root hazard. If the operator can perform actions that have not been considered in constructing the fault trees, then the impact of these actions will be incorrectly assessed as zero. This assumption needs to be investigated further to discover whether it is violated in practice, and whether the technique could be adapted to deal with cases where it is violated.
2. Techniques need to be developed to elicit judgements from risk analysts and safety engineers about the relative impacts of different actions in a form that is useful to HMI designers. We hope to adapt techniques from decision theory such as those described in [21, 11] .
3. The technique, as it stands, does not address temporal issues that may affect the safety of systems. For instance, what the impact of some action being performed too early or too late might be. This is a major limitation for practical application to complex systems.
We are currently investigating these issues.
